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ABSTRACT: This paper begins with a historical overview of the tension in Darfur 
building up to the current genocidal conflict.  After explaining the source of conflict in 
Darfur, the different methods of calculating the death toll are examined; primarily 
exploring the differences between the World Health Organization‟s Population Health 
Survey and the U.S. State Department‟s Atrocities Documentation Survey.  The 
divergence between these methods is discussed, as is their effectiveness in 
calculating an accurate death toll.  Next, the different approaches by the global 
community to intervene in the conflict in Darfur is discussed; citing specifically the 
inadequate international response.  Finally, I will provide an overview as to the 
overall approach to the Darfur conflict, both in calculation and intervention, as well 
as provide suggestions so that the global community can better supply an integrated 
response to future conflicts. 
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HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR 
 Darfur, a region in Sudan, is located in northeastern Africa.  Sudan has been 
beleaguered by harsh environmental conditions and “suffers from inadequate 
supplies of potable water, declining wildlife populations because of warfare and 
excessive hunting, soil erosion, desertification, and periodic droughts” (Library of 
Congress, 2004, p. 3).  Darfur is populated by approximately seven million people 
and has more than 30 ethnic groups; most falling into two major categories: African 
and Arab (Taber, 2008, p. 178).  The northern population is primarily Arabic and 
Muslim, whereas the southern and western territories are predominantly inhabited by 
African Christians.  Many different sources of conflict are present, including “security, 
politics, resources, water, and humanitarian and development issues” (Ki-moon, 
2007, p. A13).  “Sudan's harsh climate and scarce resources coupled with ethnic, 
tribal, and religious differences have created a history of conflict” (Taber, 2008, p. 
175).  
 Since gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1956, Sudan has 
been involved in political violence and armed conflict.  Historically, the Arabic 
population of northern Sudan has been favored politically by the British colonial 
policy over the southern and western Sudanese, or Africans (Baldauf, 2006, p. 1).  
As the transition from British rule occurred, political power over Sudan was given to 
the northern inhabitants, leaving the South without a voice.  This inequality has set 
the stage for the political violence that has since plagued the region. 
  There have been two civil wars since Sudan's independence was granted.  
Both of these wars started because the government in Khartoum (located in northern 
Sudan) capriciously denied the South political power.  The first civil war started in 
1955, when the Arab-led Khartoum government failed to create a federal system, as 
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they had promised the southern population, instead opting to maintain their political 
control.  Fearing marginalization, the African population sought to gain their 
independence by engaging in a civil war.  The first civil war lasted for seventeen 
years, ending with the signing of the Addis Ababa Accords, which granted southern 
Sudan wide regional autonomy on internal matters.  After just over a decade without 
a formal war, the second civil war began in 1983.  Sudan‟s second civil came after 
President Gaafar Nimeiri's decision to implement Islamic Shari'a law throughout the 
country on both Muslims and non-Muslims. Spurred by this ruling, southern army 
officers, led by John Garang, formed the Southern People's Liberation Army (SPLA).  
In 1991, in the midst of the war, the government even began to support the 
formation of an “Arab Alliance” to control the non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur 
(Documenting Atrocities, 2004, p. 3).  Although the second civil war was technically 
ended on December 31, 2004, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA), the violence continued. 
 The political marginalization of African communities in Darfur led to the 
formation of two prominent rebel assemblies, the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) (Bannon et al., 2005, p. 3).  
Both of these groups began their attacks on government military organizations in 
February 2003 (International Commission, 2005, p. 23).  The JEM and SLA are 
fighting against the oppression of the Northern Sudanese government and aim to 
gain more rights in terms of political participation.  They “seek equitable 
development, land rights, social and public services, democracy, and regional 
autonomy” rather than looking for succession like the South's SPLA (Idris, 2005, 
np.). 
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 The SLA, formerly the Darfur Liberation Front, emerged from tribal groups 
formed to oppose the government's Arab supremacist policies and the government 
sponsored attacks in Darfur (Bannon et al., 2005, p. 3).  The SLA was created out of 
three tribes: Fur, Massaleit, and Zaghawa; and its leadership is comprised of chosen 
representatives from all three (Flint & DeWaal, 2005, p. 76-77).  The SLA‟s Political 
Declaration demands “a new Sudan that belongs equally to all its citizens” (Unifying 
Darfur‟s Rebels, 2005, p. 82).  The biggest problem facing the SLA in the realization 
of its goals is tension and disunity among the three tribes (Unifying Darfur‟s Rebels, 
2005, p. 83-88).  The geographical and ethnic differences between the different 
groups has split the SLA and made achieving peace in Darfur much more 
complicated. 
 The JEM was started 1993 when seven members of the National Islamic 
Front (NIF) created a new group, wishing to first educate the Sudanese about the 
inequalities in Sudan (Flint & DeWaal, 2005, p. 93).  Similar to the goals of the SLA, 
the JEM aims at creating a unified Sudan; however, the JEM does not demand a 
secular government (Flint & DeWaal, 2005, p. 93-94).  The JEM has traditionally 
faced less disunity than the SLA, although it is formed from a much larger collection 
of tribal groups. 
 The Sudanese government responded to the formation of these alliances by 
further arming their militias, known as the Janjaweed, to put down the rebellion 
(Bannon et al., 2005, p. 3).  The government and the Janjaweed adopted a 
“scorched earth” tactic to calm the rebellion, targeting areas viewed as potential 
bases for the JEM and SLA and burning villages to the ground and displacing or 
killing their residents (Bannon et al., 2005, p. 3).  The following excerpt taken from 
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Bringing peace to Darfur: Lessons of the Darfur Peace Agreement explains a 
representative example: 
“A typical attack starts before day break when air 
assaults drop crude bombs on villages, killing the people 
while they are still in bed.  Amid the ensuing chaos, 
government troops in military vehicles and Janjaweed 
forces on horseback commence ground attacks on the 
villages.  They utterly destroy the villages by burning 
the homes and the crops and looting any livestock and 
other goods.  They kill the men and throw the dead 
bodies into the drinking water.  They rape the women 
and abduct or kill the children.  As they ravage the 
village, they yell racial slurs at the villagers who are 
trying desperately to stay alive.  Anyone lucky enough 
to escape the attack is driven into the desert to search 
for refuge” (Taber, 2008, p. 184). 
 The Sudanese Government has stated that any attacks it has commissioned 
were based solely on the basis of military intelligence; however, the U.N. 
Commission confirmed that government attacks were “deliberately and 
indiscriminately directed against civilians” (International Commission, 2005, p. 3).  
The Human Rights Watch has obtained documents citing governmental support of 
the Janjaweed through “recruitment, armament, and ensuring impunity” (Alta, 2004, 
p. 1).  The Human Rights Watch further stated that, “[t]he Sudanese government at 
the highest levels is responsible for widespread and systematic abuses in Darfur” 
(Alta, 2004, p. 2). 
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 As many as 90% of the African villages in Darfur have been destroyed 
(Bannon et al., 2005, p. 4).  Some estimates show more than 300,000 people are 
believed to have died during the conflict and as many as 2.7 million have been 
forced to flee their homes (MacFarquhar, 2008, np.).  Some estimates show that 
over 200,000 citizens of Darfur have been displaced and currently reside in 
neighboring Chad (International Commission, 2005, p. 3).  Beyond this figure, there 
are even a reported 1.65 million people in Internally Displaced Peoples‟ (IDP) Camps 
within Darfur, who are still subject to attacks from the Janjaweed (Human Rights 
Watch, 2007, p. 40). 
CALCULATING THE DEATH TOLL 
 There have been many different studies implemented to attempt to calculate 
the death toll of the conflict in Darfur.  Of these, two of the most prominent results 
have been reported from the Atrocities Documentation Survey (2004) and the World 
Health Organization (2004).  These surveys also represent two different approaches, 
in the crime victimization approach and the population health paradigm, respectively.  
The Atrocities Documentation Survey consisted of semi-structured, random 
interviews that relied on individual accounts of both personal atrocities as well as 
directly witnessed atrocities (Documenting Atrocities, 2004, p. 1-3).  The World 
Health Organization‟s Survey, on the other hand, collected data on the current status 
of household members, causes of death, including both illness and violence, and 
availability of basic necessities such as water, food, blankets, etc. (Gergonne & 
Morgan, 2004, p. 3).  Clearly the differences can be seen as the former survey 
collects data strictly on a victimization level, while the latter is inclusive of 
humanitarian emergencies.  Although the accuracy of the figures presented in these 
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studies are unknown, they both help to shed light on the seriousness of the crisis in 
Darfur. 
 The Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) was released by the U.S. State 
Department in September of 2004.  The ADS was compiled from survey interviews of 
1136 refugee households in Chad.  The report “enumerated thousands of deaths and 
many more rapes and atrocities that the respondents personally had seen or heard 
about before fleeing from attacks on their farms and villages over the previous year 
and a half in Darfur” (Hagan, 2008, p. 107-108).  “As of August 2004, based on 
available information, more than 405 villages in Darfur had been completely 
destroyed, with an additional 123 substantially damaged, since February 2003. 
Approximately 200,000 persons had sought refuge in eastern Chad as of August, 
according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports another 1.2 million internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) remain in western Sudan” (Documenting Atrocities, 2004, p. 1).  In 
terms of specific reported acts of violence, Darfur refugees reported witnessing or 
experiencing the following: 
 Killing of family member – 61% 
 Killing of non-family member – 
67% 
 Shooting – 44% 
 Death from displacement – 28% 
 Abduction – 25% 
 Beating – 21% 
 
 Rape – 16% 
 Hearing racial epithets – 33% 
 Village destruction – 81% 
 Theft of livestock – 80% 
 Aerial bombing – 67% 
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 Destruction of personal property – 
55% 
 Looting of personal property – 47% 
(Documenting Atrocities, 2004, p. 1) 
From this report we can begin to understand the types of atrocities taking place in 
Darfur as well as some scope of their amount.  This type of survey takes a traditional 
criminological perspective, studying crime victimization.  The preliminary estimate 
drawn from the ADS was of 400,000 deaths; although, as with any crime survey, 
room for error exists.  At the release of this report, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
concluded that genocide had occurred in Darfur (Hagan, 2008, p. 109).  The World 
Health Organization attempts to document the conflict in Darfur, providing a different 
perspective that will hopefully be more inclusive.  “While the ADS design represents 
a cutting edge example of the use of the crime victimization approach – with its 
emphasis on incident based reporting of a wide range of different kinds of criminal 
events before and in the refugee camps – the WHO survey represents an application 
of the health research approach to complex humanitarian emergencies – with its 
parallel emphasis on mortality linked to disease and nutritional problems inside the 
displacement camps” (Hagan, 2008, p. 109). 
 The World Health Organization‟s survey was also compiled in 2004, utilizing 
data collected from the Internally Displaced Persons‟ (IDP) camps.  “The study 
population include all IDPs within the accessible areas of the three states of Greater 
Darfur estimated to be 498,528, 382,626 and 288,539 for the West, North and 
South Darfur respectively by the World Food Programme (WFP). 1500 households 
per state participated in the survey” (Gergonne & Morgan, 2004, p. 2).  “The main 
cause of death reported during the survey was diarrhea, particularly affecting 
children under five years old.  The age distribution among children suggests an 
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important deficit in children under two years old.  Among adults under 50 years old, 
injuries and violence were the main causes of death.  A large proportion of IDP 
households had access to basic services, food and non-food items.  However, about a 
third of households still lack access to safe water and sanitation” (Gergonne & 
Morgan, 2004, p. 11).  The WHO survey produced findings on the Crude Mortality 
Rate (CMR) in Darfur.  CMRs represent the number of deaths for a population 
affected by an emergency situation, calculated as deaths per 10,000 per day for 
comparison purposes.  “A CMR of 1.0 was identified by the U.S. State Department in 
the mid-1980s as a useful threshold of evaluated mortality in complex humanitarian 
emergencies (Bureau of Refugee Programs 1985)” (Hagan, 2008, p. 102).  A CMR of 
2.14 for the North and West IDP camps was found in just two summer months of 
2004.  Extrapolating from these numbers, David Nabarro concluded that the death 
rate in Darfur was compounding at a rate of 5,000 to 10,000 persons per month.  
With the data available from the ADS and WHO surveys, a consensus began to be 
reached, placing the death toll between 180,000 and 400,000 (Hagan, 2008, p. 110-
112).  This consensus was not final; however, with the two biggest dissentions 
attributed to Sudanese President Al-Bashir and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, 
Robert Zoellick. 
 President Al-Bashir still fails to recognize the genocide, placing his own 
estimate at 9,000 deaths and refusing to acknowledge any occurrences of rape 
(Hagan, 2008, p. 131).  Past this outrageous claim, another conflicting account of 
the death toll came from the U.S. Secretary of State Department, who recanted its 
earlier study and provided the new figures of 60,000 to 146,000 deaths.  Robert 
Zoellick, the Assistant Secretary, Deputy to the newly appointed Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, presented these new figures.  In a press conference in Khartoum 
during his visit to Darfur, Zoellick avoided characterizing the conflict as actual 
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„genocide‟ and disputed the prevailing consensus of estimated deaths; going on to 
state that at most 146,000 „excess‟ deaths occurred, as most of the violent deaths 
had been suppressed due to the humanitarian response (Hagan, 2008, p. 112).  
There is much speculation that the United States‟ new stance on the conflict in 
Darfur came about through their allegiance with Sudanese General Gosh.  At the 
time, the U.S. was sharing military intelligence with Gosh, as part of a counter-
terrorism plan.  Seeing the conflict in Darfur as genocide would implicate General 
Gosh as a war criminal; therefore, making it impossible to work with him (Hagan, 
2008, p. 116).  As such, the United States remained silent and did not intervene in 
Darfur, similar to much of the rest of the world. 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
 The Darfur conflict provides an example in which the global community has 
utterly failed in protecting the civilian genocide from the opposing militias.  Taking 
the lead in intervening in the Darfur conflict has been the African Union (A.U.).  
Although the A.U. does not have the resources to mount a fully effective intervention 
in Darfur, they have not applied much in the means of resolution at all.  “In 2004, 
the A.U. established a small monitoring mission, the African Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS), in Darfur, consisting of some 60 monitors and 300 troops to protect them. In 
mid-2005, the number of troops increased to about 7,000” (Sarwar, 2009, p. 7).  
Although AMIS put troops in the region, it did not mandate the actual protection of 
innocent civilians.  The only requirement for protection AMIS did make was for when 
civilians were being attacked in the troop‟s presence, and still only when the force 
felt it had “enough troops to intervene” (Sarwar, 2009, p. 8). 
 The European Union (E.U.) and the North American Trade Organization 
(NATO) were the other two main international players in the resolution of the Darfur 
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crisis.  The E.U. provided financial backing for the A.U. in its attempts to end the 
conflict.  NATO has provided logistical support for the A.U. mission as well, but 
refuses to go beyond this role to try to truly induce a resolution. 
 China has recently become more active in pursuing peace in Darfur; but as 
one of the seven countries that sell weapons to Sudan as well as its largest 
international oil importer, it certainly could have gotten much more involved.  China 
has been criticized for its non-action by the global community.  “It is argued that 
China could influence the resolution of the Darfur conflict because of its large trade 
with and investment in Sudan.  China has adopted a „policy of non-interference‟ in 
Sudan‟s domestic affair and its stand on the Darfur issue is that it must be resolved 
through dialogue and negotiations” (Sarwar, 2009, p. 8). 
 As alluded to in the previous section, the United States failed to provide aid 
and intervene in Darfur; perhaps, due to its political interests.  Because of the 
American government‟s interest in eliciting information on terrorism from Sudan‟s 
intelligence chief, Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh, the genocide may have been 
overlooked.  The United States government‟s released low-estimated death toll 
therefore served to protect General Gosh rather than making him out to be a war 
criminal (Hagan, 2008, p. 116).  The United States government has finally 
succumbed to the mounting pressure to recognize the crisis in Darfur as a genocidal 
act worthy of international response.  Since their decision to intervene, the United 
States public diplomacy has been at the forefront of international response.  “The 
U.S. has imposed economic sanctions on seven Sudanese individuals and more than 
160 companies owned or controlled by the government of Sudan or linked to the 
militia to increase the pressure on Khartoum to end the violence in Darfur.  It has 
maintained bilateral and multilateral sanctions on the government of Sudan, 
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including arms embargoes, restrictions on imports and exports, and an asset freeze.  
However, it has yet to put real pressure on Khartoum for ending the sufferings of the 
Darfurians” (Sarwar, 2009, p. 8). 
 Because only a global intervention mediation effort supported by all of the 
above international players listed would be effective in order to stop the genocide in 
Darfur, it is necessary that the United Nations become further involved.  The leading 
international forces failed in their efforts to resolve the Darfur conflict.  “The A.U. 
mission has failed to stop the atrocities because of many shortcomings (a weak 
mandate, troop shortages, uncertain funding stream, and little institutional support).  
The E.U. and NATO have made it clear that they would not commit their own forces.  
China has also failed to respond because of its oil ties to the Sudan” (Sarwar, 2009, 
p. 7).  Therefore, United Nations intervention was necessary to ensure that a 
coordinated, properly resourced, and legitimate international response to the conflict 
was implemented.  
 The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) has adopted 26 resolutions since the start 
out the conflict in Darfur as well as sending constant warnings to the Sudanese 
government.  The following are the major UNSC resolutions passed: 
 1556 (2004) – mandated the government of Sudan disarm the Janjaweed 
militias and bring them to justice.  Also imposed arms embargo on non-
governmental entities. 
 1564 (2004) – created an International Commission of Inquiry to report on 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Darfur.  
 1590 (2005) – established U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). 
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 1591 (2005) – called for a ban on offensive military flights over Darfur, 
extended arms embargo to all in Darfur, and authorized targeted sanctions 
(travel ban and asset freeze). 
 1593 (2005) – referred the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
The investigation by the ICC was stonewalled by the Khartoum. 
 1679 (2006) – called on non-signatories to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA) that called for acceleration of transition to U.N. operations in Darfur. 
 1706 (2006) – mandated the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to take over the 
African Mission in Sudan (AMIS).  This resolution was rejected by the Sudan 
government. 
 1769 (2007) – established the joint A.U.-U.N. Hybrid Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID). 
 1828 (2008) – extended the mandate of the UNAMID for another year until 
July 31, 2009. 
 1881 (2009) – extended the mandate of the UNAMID for one more year. 
       (Sarwar, 2009, p. 8-9) 
Although all of these UNSC resolutions were passed, all were extremely difficult to 
operationalize in Darfur.  With the resistance of the Sudanese government and the 
lack of a U.N. force, or even a unified force, to implement and ensure the changes, 
the hope of ending the conflict seemed lost.  So, while the UNSC made some great 
suggestions for ending the conflict in Darfur, they were ineffective overall in ending 
the genocide. 
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Zaremba 
2011 Special Edition Vol. 1: 43-62 
56 
 
 Resolution 1769 established the United Nations and the African Union 
agreement on a three-phase action plan for Darfur, the U.N. Darfur Plan.  “The first 
phase involved U.N. provision of logistical and technical support for the African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS).  The second phase involved the deployment of 3,000 U.N. 
peacekeepers, including gunship helicopters, in the Sudan.  And, the third phase 
involved the „heavy support package‟ that entailed the deployment of a 20,000-
strong hybrid A.U.-U.N. force” (Sarwar, 2009, p. 9).  Although the first two phases 
were unable to contain the crisis, the U.N. still hoped to implement the final phase.  
The U.N. deployment of UNAMID began in early 2008. 
 In accordance with the UNSC mandate, UNAMID pledged to have 26,000 
military, police, and civilian personnel; the largest peacekeeping mission ever 
implemented.  The UNAMID mandate stated the following objectives: “promoting the 
re-establishment of confidence, deterring violence, providing security through 
patrolling, and deploying police forces in areas where internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) are placed” (Putting People First, 2008, p. 3).  After the first two years of the 
adoption of Resolution 1769, the U.N. mission came to a standstill, failing to 
guarantee any further protection to the people of Darfur (Sarwar, 2009, p. 9).  As of 
May 26, 2009, UNAMID military personnel was a force of 13,455, of a total 
authorized 19,555, including 12,814 troops, 378 staff officers, 179 military 
observers, and 84 liaison officers (Deployment of the AU-UN, 2009, p. 7).  While 
12,814 troops seems like a significant force in ending the conflict in Darfur, it 
realistically falls far short of what would be necessary in order to truly ensure peace.  
Even the U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, stated that, “The continued lack of 
key military enabling units, such as the medium transport units, an aerial 
reconnaissance unit, 18 medium utility helicopters and a Level-II hospital in El 
Fasher, continuous to be a source of concern, as well as the adequate maintenance 
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of contingent-owned armored personnel carriers.  In addition, the withdrawal of 
Canadian-owned armoured personnel carriers by June 30, 2009 could create a 
temporary decrease in operational capacity for up to three months while units await 
the arrival of their new equipment” (Deployment of the AU-UN, 2009, p. 8).  
 There are various reasons responsible for the failure of the hybrid UNAMID 
mission.  First and foremost is the global community‟s failure to respond with the 
required resources, equipment, and personnel.  Many of the important international 
players were simply invested enough to send personnel who meet the U.N. 
peacekeeping standards for training and equipment.  In addition to this, many 
countries that had pledged troops to the mission pulled out due to the 
dangerousness of the situation in Darfur.  Another aspect in the failure of 
implementing the UNAMID mission has been the resistance of the Sudanese 
government.  U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in commented on this resistance, 
stating that, “The mission faced considerable challenges with respect to its freedom 
of movement and ability to implement its mandate.  When taken together, these 
incidents signal a negative trend with regard to the [Sudanese] government‟s 
cooperation with the UNAMID, and include: the obstructions of UNAMID patrolling 
activities, primarily by government checkpoints; the detention of quick-impact 
projects implementing partners; confiscation of quick-impact project funds; the 
detention and apparent mistreatment of UNAMID national staff; and the prohibitively 
slow pace with which visas are currently being issued” (Deployment of the AU-UN, 
2009, p. 9). 
IMPLICATIONS 
 Running throughout this paper has been the inability of the global community 
to not only grasp the true nature of the genocide in Darfur, but also the 
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ineffectiveness in which the conflict was dealt with.  The conflict in Darfur is of a very 
complex nature; spanning social inequalities for centuries.  It involves multiple 
players inside the nation, each with its own interests.  The current genocide has 
continued over the past decade, with no end foreseeable in the near future.  
Calculating the death toll has not been an easy task and has resulted in many 
different estimates, the accuracy of which no one can be sure of.  Even the best 
available data leaves us with a consensus estimate of between 180,000 and 400,000 
deaths.  Without an accurate death toll, it becomes very difficult not only to truly 
grasp the atrocities committed, but also to hold those responsible accountable. 
 Looking to the future, it will become necessary to be able to obtain an 
accurate death toll for future atrocities.  Although we know this task will be difficult, 
it is not impossible, and we will be able to use what we have learned from the Darfur 
conflict to improve our methods.  Implementing both the ADS and WHO surveys, we 
were able to utilize two methods (both a victimization survey and a population health 
paradigm), eventually coming to a superior consensus than we otherwise would 
have.  While critics can debate the inaccuracies of both surveys separately; when 
used together, we are able to obtain a much better picture of a tragedy.  Therefore, 
it will be important to implement the traditional criminological studies on 
victimization in atrocities as well as utilizing new methods to improve our 
understanding of these human emergencies. 
 Moving on to accountability, it is important that in the future, we are better 
able to not only assign accountability within a conflict, but also to the global 
community‟s role in protecting the innocent victims.  Above is the cited 
ineffectiveness of both the U.N. and the leading international powers in suppressing 
the violence in Darfur.  All outside forces have faced strong opposition in the form of 
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology  Zaremba 
2011 Special Edition Vol. 1: 43-62 
59 
 
the Sudanese government‟s refusal to recognize any of the atrocities happening 
inside their borders; however, with a more unified and committed response from the 
global community with U.N. backing, a superior effort could have been made in 
bringing peace to Darfur.  The highlight of the endeavors has been the International 
Criminal Court‟s prosecution of some of the Sudanese government officials 
responsible for these war crimes. 
 The International Criminal Court (ICC) has brought charges against Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman for their crimes including: 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, including murder, persecution, forcible transfer 
of population, rape, inhumane acts, imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty, 
torture, attacks against the civilian population, destruction of property, pillaging, and 
outrage upon personal dignity (Warrants of Arrest, 2007, p. 2).  The ICC‟s ability to 
successfully prosecute these international criminals is important for the overall 
mission of bringing justice to Darfur and exemplifies the multi-faceted, integrated 
response necessary in these types of situations (Totten & Tyler, 2008, p. 1079).  
While it is impractical for the ICC to prosecute for all of the crimes committed across 
the large number of human rights violations in Darfur, these trials have been 
important in establishing the precedent that war criminals will be prosecuted in 
international court.  Further, it is important that the Sudanese courts follow suit and 
continue in the prosecution of human rights violators and also to include both truth 
commissions and victims‟ rights commissions.  “In this way, more perpetrators will 
be held accountable for their crimes, and more victims will have the opportunity to 
experience first-hand the actual trial and sentencing of perpetrators, whether as 
testifying witnesses or as members of the public during trial proceedings…. By 
increasing opportunities for victims to experience first-hand the administration and 
application of justice, reconciliation in a post-crisis Darfur society will be better 
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promoted and achieved, and victims and survivors will, in turn, be better able to 
transition into their new society” (Totten & Tyler, 2008, p. 1079). 
 Looking towards the future, it is important that we integrate all of our 
approaches to dealing with genocides or any other types of international crimes that 
we may face as a global community.  From documenting atrocities, intervening, 
assigning accountability, and prosecuting criminals, we must transition responsibility 
into the global community that we have become.  Globalization has become the 
current trend in our world; and, as such, our responses to international crimes must 
follow suit.  International criminology, now and in the future, will rely on the study of 
these atrocities and the integrated approaches we must take to better understand 
and prevent them.  With the advancement of globalization, criminologists must turn 
the focus from the individual, specific crimes to a broadened spectrum of 
international crimes that truly affect the majority of the global population. 
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